Venezuela, U.S. Power, and the Return of Spheres of Influence
- armantabesh
- Jan 11
- 6 min read
On January 3rd in the early hours of the day, U.S. military forces entered Caracas and captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife in a coordinated overnight raid. By dawn, the head of a sovereign state was in American custody, en route to Brooklyn to face federal charges. Within days, Washington had endorsed a new interim Venezuelan government and taken control of tens of millions of barrels of Venezuelan oil.
The Trump administration described the operation as a counter-narcotics mission. But officials, including Trump himself, quickly made clear that the intervention was about far more than drugs. It was about oil, regime change, and reasserting U.S. dominance in a region Washington has long treated as its backyard.
The result is one of the most consequential uses of American military power in the Western Hemisphere in decades — and a wild start to 2026…
What Happened?
The intervention was the endpoint of months of escalating pressure.
Beginning in August, the U.S. deployed naval vessels and aircraft near Venezuelan waters, imposed an oil blockade, seized tankers carrying Venezuelan crude, and conducted air and sea strikes on suspected trafficking routes. The administration also placed a $50 million bounty on Maduro.
On January 3, that pressure campaign finally turned into regime removal. U.S. aircraft crossed Venezuelan airspace, special forces entered Caracas, and Maduro and his wife were taken into custody. Venezuelan officials say at least 100 people were killed in the operation.
Two days after Maduro’s capture, his vice president, Delcy Rodríguez — a long-time loyalist and central figure in the Chavista regime — was sworn in as interim president with U.S. backing. Instead of elevating María Corina Machado, a more widely recognized opposition leader, who won the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize and was widely seen within Venezuela as a principal democratic challenger to Maduro, the Trump administration chose Rodríguez. Machado had been barred from running in the 2024 election, and her popular international profile put her at odds with U.S. planners concerned about internal stability(AKA ability to puppet). Washington also announced it would oversee Venezuela’s oil exports, including transferring 30 to 50 million barrels of Venezuelan crude to U.S. control.
Essentially, the United States removed a foreign government, installed a replacement, and seized control of the country’s primary economic asset.
That is a very rare combination in contemporary geopolitics. It also triggers serious legal questions.
The Domestic Legal Case Is Solid...
Federal law enforcement agencies such as the FBI and DEA possess statutory authority to arrest individuals charged with violating U.S. law, and those statutes do not explicitly limit that authority to U.S. territory. Additionally, the military may provide support to law enforcement operations, including protection and logistical assistance. From this perspective, the operation can be framed as an extension of routine law enforcement of Maduro’s narco-terrorism charges, rather than an act of war, even though it involved military force.
But Trump has also justified the operation under his Article II powers as commander-in-chief, arguing that Venezuela’s government was engaged in narco-terrorism that threatened U.S. security.
That theory is controversial.
The Constitution gives Congress, not the president, the power to authorize war. Presidents can act unilaterally only in response to an imminent threat. Venezuela had not attacked the United States, nor was there evidence of a pending military strike.
Designating Venezuelan gangs as terrorist organizations does not give the White House a blank check to use military force against a foreign state. 52 senators, including 5 Republicans(Rand Paul (KY), Lisa Murkowski (AK), Susan Collins (ME), Todd Young (IN), and Josh Hawley (MO)), have said Trump exceeded his authority, and some have attempted to limit future military action in Venezuela through War Powers resolutions.
The administration’s legal position rests on a new precedent: that drug trafficking can be treated as an armed conflict justifying cross-border military operations. If accepted, it would dramatically expand presidential war-making power.
International Law Is Tougher...
The U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force against another country except in self-defense or with U.N. Security Council approval. Neither applied here. Venezuela did not attack the U.S., and the Security Council did not authorize military action.
There is also the question of head-of-state immunity. Sitting heads of government are protected from arrest by foreign countries. Even if Maduro committed crimes, international law does not permit another state to seize him by force while he remains president.
This brings up the question of whether Maduro is the legitimate sovereign of Venezuela. A previous precedent is the 1992 conviction of former Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega in U.S. federal court. His conviction for drug trafficking was deemed legal under U.S. domestic law because U.S. courts rejected Noriega's immunity claims, since he was not seen as the official Panamanian leader. Because of Noriega, American judges are unlikely to dismiss the case against Maduro even if his arrest violated international law.
In terms of sovereignty, Maduro clearly exercises substantial control within Venezuela. Venezuelan governing structures, most importantly the military and state bureaucracy, continue to recognize and obey him. There is no rival authority capable of independently governing Venezuelan territory, nor is the state fragmented into competing power centers. Even external pressure, including sanctions and diplomatic isolation, has not meaningfully prevented Maduro from exercising control inside the country.
Legitimacy, however, presents a different case. Legitimacy depends on public acceptance and the belief that authority is “right and proper.” Venezuela’s 2018 and 2024 elections were widely viewed as fraudulent internally and externally, undermining the democratic basis of Maduro’s rule. Even if Maduro maintains obedience through coercion or institutional loyalty, this compliance does not equate to legitimacy.
Why Venezuela Became the Target
Oil
Venezuela holds the largest proven oil reserves in the world. Trump has repeatedly claimed the country “stole” oil from American companies when it nationalized its industry decades ago. His administration now controls Venezuelan crude exports and plans to sell that oil on global markets.
Regime Change
Maduro governs through repression, manipulated elections, and security forces loyal to him. Washington has wanted him gone for years. Military removal was simply the fastest way to achieve that goal, even if it bypassed Venezuelan voters and international norms.
China, Russia, and the Monroe Doctrine
China and Russia have also invested heavily in Venezuela, funding its government, buying its oil, and supplying its military. Trump explicitly said he did not want either power “next door.”
This is the Monroe Doctrine in modern form: the idea that the Western Hemisphere is a U.S. sphere of influence. Theodore Roosevelt also once claimed the U.S. had the right to intervene in Latin American countries to preserve “order.” The Venezuela operation is continuing that same logic.
What Venezuela Looks Like Now
Venezuela is not a functioning state.
Years of sanctions, corruption, and economic collapse have left more than 90% of households in poverty. Roughly 8 million people have fled the country. Electricity, food, and clean water are unreliable.
Maduro maintained control through coercion, but sanctions and isolation weakened the broader economy without dislodging elites. Now, the U.S. has removed him, but replaced him with a weak government that lacks democratic legitimacy and depends on American backing.
That combination tends to produce instability.
The Health System and Economy Tell the Story
Venezuela’s healthcare collapse reflects decades of economic reliance on oil revenue and the sudden removal of that revenue stream. Oil exports accounted for a majority of government income, used not just for public spending but for importing food, medicine, and medical equipment. When sanctions hit after 2017, Venezuela lost tens of billions in oil income, which sharply reduced its ability to fund imports of essential goods and services.
Hospitals already faced chronic shortages of antibiotics, insulin, cancer drugs, and basic supplies. Many healthcare facilities operated at fractions of capacity, with up to 70 % of beds and operating rooms non-functional and medicine shortages so severe that diseases like malaria and diphtheria reemerged. Doctors and nurses emigrated in large numbers because wages and working conditions collapsed alongside the broader economy.
Now, with the U.S. controlling Venezuela’s oil exports and revenue, the state’s ability to fund health services is even more uncertain. Oil revenue has effectively been severed from the Venezuelan treasury, at least temporarily, as tens of millions of barrels are sold under U.S. oversight and proceeds managed externally. That deprives Caracas of the foreign exchange needed to import food, medicine, and equipment.
Without a functioning oil sector feeding public coffers, Venezuela’s economic crisis deepens: its currency has plunged on black markets, inflation is surging, and the fiscal collapse threatens to shrink government services further. Public hospitals, already depleted, now face the prospect of even fewer resources to pay staff, maintain facilities, or buy supplies. The combined result is a feedback loop where economic breakdown undermines healthcare, and failing healthcare worsens human suffering
What This Means Going Forward
The Venezuela operation marks a shift in how power is exercised in the Western Hemisphere.
The United States removed a foreign government, seized its resources, and justified the move as both law enforcement and strategic necessity. China and Russia were sent a message. So were U.S. allies.
Whether Venezuela becomes more democratic or more stable is an open question. But the precedent is clear: military force, not international law or elections, decides who governs.
For a country already shattered by sanctions, poverty, and mass emigration, that is unlikely to be the foundation of a sustainable recovery.
